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This introductory article for the special issue entitled “Social Psychological Perspectives on the Legitimation of Social Inequal-
ity” reviews various theoretical frameworks applied to the study of this topic. Legitimation of social inequality occurs through
individual-level, group-level, and system-level processes. In societies in which egalitarianism and fairness are core cultural
values, legitimation permits differential treatment of people on the basis of their social group memberships while allowing
people to maintain positive self-images, to reinforce group-based hierarchies and to justify a status quo that systematically
benefits some individuals and groups more than others. In this article, we focus on three major theoretical perspectives in social
psychology that have inspired most of the research featured in this special issue, and we offer a general overview of the articles
to follow, expanding upon their connections to one another and to the theme of the issue. We highlight the promise of research on
legitimation of social inequality not only for developing a deeper and more integrative theoretical understanding of intergroup
relations but also for guiding interventions to achieve social equality in practice. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
LEGITIMATION OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Fairness and justice are said to be fundamental human needs
(Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Clayton, 2011) that are rooted in evolved
dispositions to experience inequity aversion (e.g., Boehm, 2012;
Brosnan, 2006). Justice is part of the fabric of human society
and is critical to the establishment of cooperation, reciprocity,
and coordination that is necessary for group living (Tyler, 2011;
see also Jost & Kay, 2010). The fulfillment of justice standards
brings with it a sense of control, predictability, satisfaction, and
trust in the complexity of social interaction, and this, in turn, en-
hances mental and physical well-being (e.g., Luo & Hsieh,
1997; O’Brien & Major, 2005; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Yet, in a great many ways, life is plainly not fair. Group-based
hierarchies within societies are ubiquitous and, according to some
authors, are rooted firmly in human evolution (Sidanius & Pratto,
1999; Somit & Peterson, 1996). Historical and cross-cultural
analyses reveal that members of dominant groups enjoy more
privileges, have greater access to social and material resources,
and are given more opportunities for social advancement than
members of non-dominant groups (e.g., Blumer, 1958; Corning,
2011; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Such privileges may be earned,
but often they are not. By virtue of the lottery of birth and social
category memberships alone, members of dominant groups and
classes often receive far-better opportunities for success and*Correspondence to: Rui Costa Lopes, Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universida
E-mail: rui.lopes@ics.ul.pt
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.well-being than do members of subordinate groups—irrespective
of considerations such as individual merit or deservingness.
Hierarchical relations between social groups are by no
means unchangeable, but they are surprisingly stable across
time. Social psychologists have argued that inequality persists
not only because of the coordinated efforts of members of
dominant groups but also, to some extent, because of active
and passive forms of support provided by members of non-
dominant groups (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). The
stability of inequality is remarkable—and some would say
worrisome—given the dramatic disparities of wealth, opportu-
nity, and privilege that exist in the society. In contemporary
capitalist societies, such disparities appear to be growing wider
over time. In an ironic twist, the motivation to perceive
existing arrangements as fair and just may contribute to the
acceptance and legitimation of social inequality, insofar as it
leads people to blame individual victims for their plight rather
than situational or societal factors (e.g., Hafer & Bègue, 2005;
Jost & Kay, 2010; Lerner, 1980).
This special issue of the European Journal of Social
Psychology presents new research illuminating several impor-
tant facets of the legitimation of social inequality. These contri-
butions illustrate the value of investigating the phenomenon at
multiple levels of analysis. The articles in this special issue adopt
distinct but largely complementary theoretical perspectives.
Taken as a whole, they cover social structural influences (e.g.,
perceived longevity and stability of the social system),de de Lisboa, Avenida Prof. Anibal Bettencourt, 9, 1600-189 Lisboa, Portugal.
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perception), individual differences (in prejudice, personality,
and ideology), and developmental changes (in children). The
work ranges impressively in terms of theoretical and methodo-
logical approaches, geographical reach, dimensions of social
and economic inequalities, and the sheer variety of antecedents
and outcomes associated with the process of legitimation.
In this introductory essay, we offer a brief theoretical
overview of work on the social psychological legitimation
of inequality. We outline scholarly progress in historical
terms, introduce the most influential contemporary perspec-
tives, and highlight the novel contributions of the articles in
this special issue. Specifically, in the next section, we review
some of the most basic concepts and approaches related to the
legitimation of inequality. After that, we focus on three major
theoretical perspectives in social psychology that have
inspired most of the research featured in this special issue.
Next, we offer a general overview of the articles to follow,
expanding upon their connections to one another and to the
theme of the issue.THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMATION IN SOCIAL
SCIENCEThe concept of legitimacy has been central to Western philosoph-
ical thought since at least the time of ancient Greece (e.g., Tyler,
2006; Zelditch, 2001). Legitimacy generally refers to the percep-
tion that a given actor (or action) is consistent with socially ac-
cepted principles, standards, and expectations (e.g., Berger &
Luckmann, 1966; Johnson, Dowd,&Ridgeway, 2006; Luhmann,
1969). Or, as Zelditch (2001) explained, “something is legitimate
if it is in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and pro-
cedures [that are] accepted by a group” (p. 33).
Within social psychology, legitimacy reflects “the belief
among members of a society that there are adequate reasons”
for a request or behavior (Tyler, 1997, p. 323)—that it is
“appropriate, proper, and just” (Tyler, 2006, p. 375). Legiti-
macy allows individuals and groups to exert influence over
others to gain voluntary deference in the absence of coercion.
Although much research on legitimacy has focused on compli-
ance with authority figures and their demands (see Tyler, 2006)
for a review), perceptions of legitimacy are also central to
judgments and attributions about whether actions, events,
and social systems are fair and just (Jost & Major, 2001;
Lerner, 1980).
Legitimation refers to the social and psychological pro-
cesses by which attitudes, behaviors, and social arrangements
are justified as conforming to normative standards—including,
but not limited to—standards of justice. In societies in which
equality is enshrined as one of the pillars of social organization,
legitimacy and legitimation constitute key elements of stable re-
lations within and between social groups. Individuals are more
willing to comply with authorities, even when it entails personal
sacrifice, to the extent that they perceive those authorities as
having been selected through legitimate means and their
decision-making procedures as fair (Tyler & Blader, 2000).
Legitimacy is also a critical factor in intergroup relations.
According to social identity theory, individuals derive self-Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.esteem from their memberships in social groups and are
therefore motivated to promote the positive distinctiveness of
the groups to which they belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The
manner in which individuals satisfy their needs for self-esteem
through their affiliations with social groups is determined by
(among other things) their beliefs about status relations between
groups, the perceived legitimacy of those relations, and the per-
meability of intergroup boundaries. For example, perceiving sta-
tus relations as illegitimate and unstable, and group boundaries
as impermeable, is theorized to stimulate collective action on
the part of low-status group members (van Zomeren, Postmes,
& Spears, 2008). By contrast, viewing status differences as sta-
ble and legitimate, and group boundaries as permeable, leads
members of low-status groups to disidentify with their own
group and to seek membership in a higher-status group
(Ellemers, 2001). It follows that ideological processes of system
legitimation—that is, claims about whether inequality between
groups is or is not justified—crucially affect relations among in-
dividuals and groups in society (Jost &Major, 2001; Moscovici,
1988, pp. 221–222).
The emphasis of much recent work—which is the topic of
this special issue—is on how social and psychological pro-
cesses of legitimation can contribute to the stability of puta-
tively unfair relations within and between groups. Decades
of research on prejudice (and intergroup biases more broadly)
implicate legitimation as a key mechanism underlying the per-
petuation of inequality (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses,
2010; Jackman, 1994; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Major, 1994;
Tajfel, 1981). Legitimation has been identified as a critical
factor supporting sexism (Jackman, 1994), racism (Sidanius
& Pratto, 1999), and classism (Hochschild, 1981; Kluegel &
Smith, 1986). It played a major ideological role in the creation
and maintenance of slavery (Faust, 1981; Fields, 1990), and it
continues to play a major role in shaping anti-immigration legis-
lation and “official language” policies. At the same time, percep-
tions of legitimacy are essential to processes of persuasion and
social influence, cooperation with authorities, political move-
ments, and so on (e.g., Kelman, 2001; Raven & French, 1958;
Tyler, 2006). For this reason, Jost and Major (2001) highlighted
the “double-edged” nature of legitimation processes:
Although processes of legitimization and delegitimization
can serve disastrous ends, such as the preservation of unjust,
oppressive systems of social stratification, they can also serve
the causes of justice, progress, and social change (p. 12).
Empirical research on the legitimation of inequality as a
“dependent variable”—that is, an outcome of focal interest—
did not receive concentrated attention in social psychology
until the mid-1990s (Jost & Major, 2001; Tyler, 1997). This
is somewhat surprising, given that legitimation processes
were assumed in several research lines of social psychologi-
cal research, such as Milgram’s (1974) experiments on obedi-
ence to authority and Lerner’s (1980) demonstrations of
victim blaming in response to threats to the belief in a just
world as well as other studies of justice behavior and social
exclusion (e.g., Darley, 1992; Deutsch, 1985; Opotow,
1990; Tyler, 1989). Sustained, systematic attention to the
social, cognitive, and motivational dynamics of legitimation
followed the development of theoretical frameworks associ-
ated with aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004;Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43, 229–237 (2013)
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1993), and system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994). We
briefly summarize the guiding assumptions of each frame-
work before turning to a consideration of the articles included
in this special issue.CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE
LEGITIMATION OF INEQUALITYContemporary approaches to legitimation focus on different
levels of analyses and the different functions that legitimation
serves at the individual, group, and societal levels. At the
individual level, legitimation can allow people to maintain
positive self-images, personally as well as publicly, while still
discriminating against others in subtle ways. At the group
level, legitimation reinforces the advantaged position of
dominant groups while reducing resistance—and sometimes
promoting the acceptance—of non-dominant groups for occu-
pying a disadvantaged position in the group hierarchy. At the
societal level, psychological tendencies to defend, bolster,
and justify aspects of the status quo shape the worldviews of
those who are most invested in the social system. These differ-
ent influences are complementary, operating in concert to
affect attitudes, beliefs, aspirations, and behaviors in ways that
contribute to the stratification of social life. In the next
sections, we review various individual-level, group-level, and
system-level perspectives that have been influential when it
comes to the study of legitimation and are especially relevant
to the articles in this special issue.
Aversive Racism and Maintenance of Self-Image
Equality is a core value in most societies (Schwartz, 1992),
and it typically ranks high in individuals’ hierarchies of per-
sonal values (Rokeach, 1973). Overtly racist, sexist, and class-
ist beliefs and attitudes are far less common now than they
were half a century ago (e.g. Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, &
Krysan, 1997). Individuals tend to experience negative emo-
tions when they realize they have violated egalitarian stan-
dards, and those who are especially committed to them feel
strong self-directed emotions, such as guilt and compunction
(Monteith, Arthur, & Flynn, 2010).
Kovel (1970) was among the first to describe the phenome-
non of “aversive racism”, whereby individuals may endorse
principles of racial equality, sympathize with victims of past
injustices, and genuinely regard themselves as non-
prejudiced. At the same time, however, aversive racists pos-
sess conflicting, often nonconscious, negative attitudes about
members of other groups that are rooted in basic psychological
processes, such as social categorization, that promote racial
bias (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986;
Pearson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2009). Aversive racism can
be observed wherever there is a strong tradition of egalitarian-
ism, such as in the USA (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), Canada
(Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008), and most
European democratic societies (e.g., Hodson, Hooper,
Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2005; Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn,
1993; Monteiro, França, & Rodrigues, 2009).Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.The aversive racism framework helps to identify when dis-
crimination against Black people and other minority groups is
likely to occur. Because aversive racists recognize and accept
egalitarian values and truly aspire to be non-prejudiced, they
should not exhibit bias in situations in which discrimination
would be apparent to others and—just as importantly—to
themselves. At the same time, aversive racists’ unconscious
negativity is likely to surface in subtle, indirect, and rational-
izable ways. Discrimination, in other words, is likely to occur
when social norms against prejudice or inequality are weak or
relaxed, when guidelines for appropriate behavior are vague or
unspecified, or when the basis for social judgment is ambigu-
ous. Importantly, given the theme of this special issue,
discrimination will result when an aversive racist can justify
a negative response on the basis of some factor other than race.
Under these circumstances, aversive racists may engage in
behaviors that ultimately harm minorities but in ways that
allow them to maintain self-images that are non-prejudiced
and that insulate them from recognizing their behavior as ille-
gitimate. Support for the aversive racism framework has been
obtained across a broad range of experimental contexts, in-
cluding interpersonal judgments, helping behavior both
inside and outside of the laboratory, selection decisions in
employment and college admissions, and policy and legal
decisions (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Pearson et al., 2009).
Sears (1988) observed that “symbolic racism”—understood
as a blend of negative racial affect picked up in childhood with
individualistic, politically conservative opinions and values—
permits opposition to a range of policies that are designed to
promote the general welfare and advancement of members of
disadvantaged groups (Henry & Sears, 2002; Sears & Henry,
2005). This is because symbolic racism enables adherents to
deny that bias still exists (e.g., “racism is a thing of the past”),
justifies the disadvantaged status of others through victim-
blaming attributions (e.g., “they are lazy”), or legitimizes
opposition to the policy as a way of upholding principles of
fairness (e.g., “they have made excessive demands” or “they
have gotten more than they deserve”).
Crandall and Eshleman (2003), building on social-
normative assumptions that are similar to those underpinning
the study of aversive racism, proposed the justification-
suppression model, which holds that individuals may have
internalized egalitarian values, but may hold prejudiced be-
liefs anyway. Prejudice is usually suppressed by anti-
prejudice norms and personal standards, but the bias will be
expressed whenever a justification that allows the individual
to express prejudice without being sanctioned is available.
Presumably, ideologies that legitimize the existing social or-
der would be prime candidates to “release” prejudicial re-
sponses (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Similarly, according to the justified discrimination model, le-
gitimation is a mediating mechanism by which prejudice leads
to discrimination in ostensibly egalitarian contexts (Pereira,
Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010). When Portuguese participants
were made to think about Turkish people as being less than
fully human, they perceived them as more likely to pose a
symbolic threat to European society, and they were more
likely to oppose their entrance into the European Union—
but only when an egalitarian norm was also activated (Pereira,
Vala, & Leyens, 2009).Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43, 229–237 (2013)
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Group Hierarchies
According to Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius, Pratto, &
Mitchell, 1994), human societies tend to organize themselves as
group-based social hierarchies where at least one group enjoys
greater social status and power than other groups. Sidanius and
Pratto (1999; see also Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011; Sidanius,
Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004) evoke both individual and insti-
tutional factors to explain how group hierarchies are formed and
maintained. According to the theory, these group hierarchies are
maintained through legitimizing myths, that is, consensually
shared social ideologies that justify the behavior that distributes
the positive and negative social value within the social system.
The theory distinguishes between two functional types of legiti-
mizing myths: “hierarchy-enhancing” legitimizing myths and
“hierarchy-attenuating” legitimizing myths. The first kind pro-
vides the moral and intellectual justifications for group-based op-
pression and social inequality. People endorse these ideologies
that legitimize inequality as a function of their general desire for
group-based dominance. This general desire has been termed so-
cial dominance orientation (SDO).
The typical example of a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing
myth identified within this theory is meritocratic ideology. This
belief system locates the cause of status differences in the indi-
vidual talents and efforts of group members. Although meritoc-
racy states that people should be judged on the basis of their
abilities, not their group membership, people often infer the
quality of a person’s input on the basis of the status of the groups
to which they belong. Stronger endorsement of meritocracy
among members of socially disadvantaged groups (e.g., women
and Latina/os) is related to greater blame ascribed to their group
and weaker attributions to racism or sexism for social inequality
(e.g., McCoy & Major, 2007). The effects of emphasizing
meritocracy manifest themselves cross culturally. For example,
emphasizing the value of meritocracy led Portuguese citizens
to more strongly oppose the entry of the Turkish people
(perceived as a lower-status group) to the European Union
(Pereira et al., 2009). In New Zealand, stronger endorsement of
meritocracy by White people, the socially dominant group,
was associated with more negative attitudes toward bicultural-
ism (Sibley & Wilson, 2007).
System Justification Theory and Maintenance of the
Status Quo
According to system justification theory, people are motivated
to defend, justify, and bolster aspects of the status quo, includ-
ing existing social, economic, and political systems, institu-
tions, and arrangements (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost &
Hunyady, 2005). This framework focuses on the social and
psychological processes by which people—as individuals
and as members of groups—legitimize the institutions and
arrangements in the society, often coming to see social
inequality as not only legitimate but also natural and necessary.
As Jost and van der Toorn (2012) noted,
System justificationmotivation is theorized to manifest itself in
a number of different ways (e.g., in terms of stereotyping,
ideology, attribution), to occur implicitly (i.e., nonconsciously)Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.as well as explicitly, and to serve underlying epistemic,
existential, and relational needs (p. 313).
Consistent with the proposition that people have fundamental
system-justifying goals, threats to the social system motivate in-
dividuals to defend it (Jost et al., 2010). For example, Kay, Jost,
and Young (2005) found that US participants exposed to a pas-
sage that included system-threatening statements (e.g., “These
days, many people in the U.S. feel disappointed with the nation’s
condition”) actively attempted to bolster the sagging legitimacy
of the system by judging powerful people to be more intelligent
and independent, and powerless people to be the opposite. These
effects occur cross culturally. When Israeli citizens read a similar
system-threat passage about Israel, they relied more heavily on
stereotypes to rationalize social and economic inequalities be-
tween Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews (Jost, Kivetz, Rubini,
Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005).
Recent work on system justification theory has focused on
factors that influence the need to engage in system justification
and thus ultimately on the legitimation of social inequality. For
example, people are especially likely to justify and rationalize
the way things are when they feel dependent upon the overarch-
ing social, economic, or political system. In a series of studies
conducted in educational, political, and legal settings, van der
Toorn, Tyler, and Jost (2011) found that the more individuals ex-
perienced outcome dependence with respect to a given authority
figure, the more legitimacy they ascribed to him or her, and the
more deference they reported after adjusting for procedural treat-
ment (see also van der Toorn et al., in press).
Another closely related situational variable that activates
system justification tendencies is system inevitability—the
extent to which a system is experienced as inescapable or
unavoidable. That is, when individuals feel trapped in a partic-
ular social system, they are more likely to defend and justify
its policies and practices. For instance, Laurin, Shepherd, and
Kay (2010) found that when participants were led to believe
that their freedom of movement was highly restricted—when
leaving their country was extremely difficult—they expressed
stronger system justification tendencies even in domains that
were unrelated to emigration policy, such as gender disparities
in society. Conversely, when the status quo is regarded as
clearly changeable, individuals are less motivated to defend
it (Johnson & Fujita, 2012).
A distinctive tenet of system justification theory is that indi-
viduals, even those who are disadvantaged by the status quo,
possess at least some degree of system justification motivation
(Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). This system-justifying motiva-
tion is often activated unconsciously, without deliberate
awareness or intent (Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002; Jost
et al., 2004; Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). As a con-
sequence, people engage in biased information processing in
favor of system-serving conclusions (e.g., Hennes, Jost, &
Ruisch, 2013) and exhibit “classic” properties of goal pursuit,
so that people may engage in multiple, functionally inter-
changeable means of reaching the desired end state of justifying
the system (Jost et al., 2010; Kay et al., 2005). The social sys-
tems that individuals are motivated to justify may be small in
size and scope, such as (at the most micro level of analysis) rela-
tionship dyads and family units, or they may extend to formal
and informal status hierarchies, institutions and organizations,Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43, 229–237 (2013)
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societies (Fiske, 2010; Wakslak, Jost, & Bauer, 2011).
Understanding the dynamics of these basic system-
justifying needs provides important insights about why people
endorse ideologies that promote the maintenance of the status
quo even when this endorsement legitimizes social inequality.
In particular, system-justifying ideologies are sets of beliefs
that “can explain or make sense of a social system in ways
that provide a rationale for the appropriateness or reasonable-
ness of differences in authority, power, status, or wealth”
(Tyler, 2006, p. 376). Jost and Hunyady (2005) have identi-
fied a number of common system-justifying ideologies,
including the Protestant work ethic, meritocratic assump-
tions, fair market ideology, belief in a just world, benevolent
sexism, power distance, SDO, authoritarianism, and political
conservatism.
System-justifying ideologies also undermine support for
the redistribution of resources and inhibit the kinds of emo-
tional responses (e.g., moral outrage, guilt, and frustration)
that stimulate efforts to help the disadvantaged (Wakslak, Jost,
Tyler, & Chen, 2007). Thus, system-justifying ideologies are
potentially powerful tools for legitimating inequality,
perpetuating social disparities, and maintaining support for
the status quo. In summary, the goal to defend, bolster, and
justify the social system leads individuals and groups to
exaggerate the system’s virtues, downplay its vices, and see
the societal status quo as more fair and desirable than it actu-
ally is. This motive contributes to an inherently conservative
tendency to vindicate the status quo (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski,
& Sulloway, 2003).
In the next section, we briefly review the articles in this
special issue, which address legitimation of social inequality
from individual-level, group-level, and societal-level, or
system-level perspectives. The articles, which are diverse in their
perspectives andmethodologies, collectively enhance our under-
standing of legitimation, both extending existing theories and
integrating perspectives across different levels of analysis.OVERVIEW OF ARTICLES IN THE SPECIAL ISSUEThe goal of this special issue of the European Journal of
Social Psychology is to bring together cutting-edge research
that addresses social and psychological processes of legitima-
tion when it comes to social and economic inequalities, focus-
ing on the origins, manifestations, and consequences of
legitimation. In some ways, this is the first attempt to take
stock of recent work in this area since literature reviews were
published by Jost and Major (2001) and Tyler (2006). In terms
of scope, we sought to include articles that consider the per-
spectives of members of disadvantaged as well as advantaged
groups and to integrate interdisciplinary and multi-
methodological approaches, including laboratory research as
well as cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys.
From over 50 initial submissions, we selected nine empiri-
cal articles for inclusion in this special issue. The first two
articles focus on societal or system-level variables that are
quite similar (or at least compatible), namely perceived system
longevity and perceived system stability; in both cases, theCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.researchers investigate the impact of these variables on the legit-
imation of inequality. Both articles adopt a system justification
perspective, focusing on cognitive-motivational tendencies to
justify aspects of the societal status quo.
The first article, by Blanchar and Eidelman, features two
ingenious experiments that contribute to our understanding
of ideological responses to social and economic inequalities
by systematically manipulating the perceived longevity of
the system. In their first study, the researchers represent the
intellectual origins of capitalism—as exemplified by Adam
Smith’s Wealth of Nations—as relatively recent or old with
the use of a subjective timeline. They observe that the eco-
nomic system in the USA is perceived by American, British,
and Canadian participants as more legitimate—and inequality
under capitalism as more justifiable—when the origins of
capitalism are presented as significantly older. In a second
study, Blanchar and Eidelman find that depicting the Indian
Caste system as especially old causes both Indian and
American participants to justify inequality under the Caste
system more strongly. In both studies, the effects are mediated
by economic system justification.
Laurin, Gaucher, and Kay illuminate a similar phenomenon
in the second article of this special issue by demonstrating that
the perceived stability of certain features of the social system
influences the justification of the system as a whole. In Study
1, participants who witnessed stability (rather than change)
in the domain of gender inequality in business expressed less
willingness to support initiatives targeting inequalities in
unrelated domains. In Study 2, the mere activation of the ab-
stract concept of stability increased the spontaneous tendency
to justify inequalities present within social systems (although
this effect only emerged for politically liberal participants).
The third article, by Jasko and Kossowska, also addresses
perceptions of legitimacy at the system level, but it considers
group-level dynamics as well. Specifically, this article focuses
on the implications of superordinate group identification. It
demonstrates that the attempt to create harmony by emphasiz-
ing a common ingroup identity results, perhaps ironically, in a
greater acceptance of inequality in society (Dixon, Levine,
Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, &
Pratto, 2009). This “darker side of we” is described in two
studies that analyze the role of superordinate identification
on the legitimation of intergroup inequalities in Poland. In
Study 1, the researchers find that when the participants’ group
is disadvantaged, making the superordinate identity salient
(i.e., Polish national identification) led to a stronger justification
of the unequal financial system. In fact, this legitimation effect
was stronger among members of the minority (low-status) than
majority (high-status) groups. In Study 2, the authors extend this
effect to intergroup relations on the basis of religion, demonstrat-
ing that national identification is related to a stronger degree of
justification of the display of crucifixes in public schools among
nonbelievers. Taken together, the two studies by Jasko and
Kossowska suggest how strategies that are designed to create
social harmony (e.g., emphasis on commonality or assimilation)
also solidify the societal status quo by increasing the minority
group members’ support for the values and priorities of the
majority group.
The next four articles focus on problems of prejudice.
França and Monteiro address one of the basic motivationsEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43, 229–237 (2013)
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image by complying with social norms. Moreover, the authors
employ a socio-developmental approach to the issue and in-
voke processes of justification to delineate the circumstances
under which individuals exhibit discriminatory behavior. In
Study 1, the researchers demonstrate that older White children
in Brazil exhibit more discriminatory behavior only when an os-
tensibly non-racial reason (i.e., the fact that White children
worked harder than the other children) can be used to “justify”
treating Black children less favorably than White children. In
Study 2, they demonstrate that older children only discriminate
against Black children when the normative structure of the situ-
ation is ambiguous, whereas younger children discriminate re-
gardless of the presence or absence of an anti-prejudice norm.
The fifth and sixth articles combine the study of prejudice
and discrimination with a focus on legitimation processes as-
sociated with the maintenance of social hierarchies, such as
those associated with authoritarianism and SDO (Altemeyer,
1998; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In the fifth article, Carvacho,
Zick, Haye, González, Manzi, Kocik, and Bertl address a
question that has persisted for decades in the social sciences:
What is the nature of the relationship between social class
and prejudice? Using representative samples of survey respon-
dents from several European countries, Carvacho et al. find
that lower levels of income and education (two standard indi-
cators of social class) are associated with higher levels of prej-
udice and that these relationships are mediated by right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA) and SDO. Drawing on longitudinal
data obtained in Chile and Germany, they find that RWA is
a more consistent mediator of the relationship between social
class and prejudice than is SDO, especially when it comes to
the effects of education.
Bahns and Crandall demonstrate that beliefs about the accept-
ability of social inequality—as measured in terms of SDO—may
be used to legitimize antigay discrimination when relative status
positions between gay and straight groups are perceived to be
shifting. In an experimental study that included behavioral mea-
sures, the authors show that heterosexuals who believed that so-
cial inequality is legitimate (high-SDO) reacted defensively to a
perceived status gain by gays—by donating money to antigay
causes. However, when perceived threat to group position was
low, high-SDO heterosexuals actually exhibited enhanced toler-
ance by increasing their donations to the pro-gay cause. These
results suggest that endorsing social inequality legitimates preju-
dice and discrimination but only affects behavior when status
positions are threatened.
The seventh article, which is by Saguy, Chernyak-Hai,
Andrighetto, and Bryson, also investigates, albeit indirectly,
the role of threat. These authors focus on the concept of feeling
wronged, which refers to “advantaged group members who
experience themselves being unfairly accused of harboring
racial or ethnic biases” (Saguy et al., p. 292, this issue). On
the basis of the idea that members of advantaged groups see
those accusations as a threat to their ingroup image, Saguy
and colleagues hypothesized that participants who “feel
wronged” would need to restore their morally impaired iden-
tity. In this attempt to restore their image, advantaged group
members frame social inequality that benefits their group as le-
gitimate and justified. In the first study, the extent to which
advantaged group members feel wronged predicts theirCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.perceptions of intergroup inequality as more legitimate, which
discourages them from promoting social change. In the second
study, the authors manipulated a sense of feeling wronged by
emphasizing unfair blame directed toward the advantaged
ingroup. In this study, using a sample of Israeli–Jews and fo-
cusing on Jewish–Arab relations in Israel, the sense of
feeling wronged undermined participants’ willingness to par-
ticipate in actions redressing inequality, through legitimacy
perceptions.
The last two articles focus on gender inequality and bring us
back full circle to a system justification perspective. Brown and
Diekman analyze whether individuals’ system justificationmoti-
vation serves to undermine social change. Specifically, they pro-
pose that the presence of even a single exemplar of an
underrepresented group (e.g., a female political candidate) in
an unequally distributed political system (e.g., a parliament com-
posed by a strong majority of male members) would increase the
motivation to legitimize that unequal system. Accordingly, in the
first two experiments, the authors demonstrate that merely men-
tioning the presence of female political candidates leads both
men and women to score higher on general system justifica-
tion–as measured with Kay and Jost’s (2003) scale. In Experi-
ment 3, they find that the presence of female political
candidates increases individuals’ implicit preferences associated
with maintaining the current sociopolitical system.
The final article included in the special issue, which is
coauthored by McCoy, Wellman, Cosley, Saslow, and Epel,
hightlights one reason why low-status group members might
endorse certain system-justifying ideologies that legitimize
their own state of disadvantage. The authors propose that
low-status group members, just like high-status group mem-
bers, benefit psychologically from the endorsement of merito-
cratic beliefs insofar as such beliefs strengthen perceptions of
control over future outcomes. In two studies, the authors
observe a positive relationship between the belief in meritoc-
racy and well-being (self-esteem and physical health), which
is mediated by perceived control. This pattern holds for
relatively high-status and low-status individuals (with status
operationalized in terms of gender and socioeconomic status).
This last article may help to explain why those who are not
privileged by the status quo may nevertheless want to see it
as fair, legitimate, and just.CONCLUDING REMARKSProcesses of legitimation may take a variety of forms, embody
different motivations, and produce a wide range of social con-
sequences. This heterogeneity is reflected in the number and
diversity of theoretical models, focusing on different levels
of analysis that have been brought to bear on these issues (Jost
& Major, 2001). As suggested by Jost, Burgess, and Mosso
(2001), these processes operate at the level of the individual,
the group, and the system. We identified three basic goals or
motives served by processes of legitimation: (i) the self-
serving goal to preserve a positive image by, among other
things, complying with socially desirable norms and values;
(ii) the group-serving goal to promote social dominance and
hegemonic, hierarchical arrangements; and (iii) the system-Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43, 229–237 (2013)
Introduction to issue on legitimation of social inequality 235serving goal to defend, bolster, and justify the societal status
quo. These various approaches to understanding legitimation
and social inequality emphasize distinct antecedents and conse-
quences, as well as different functions served by legitimation. At
the same time, these different approaches are perhaps more
compatible than is often realized, and (taken in conjunction) they
would appear to constitute the most common social psycholog-
ical motivations for the legitimation of inequality.
Legitimation is a powerful influence in the maintenance of
social inequality because it helps to resolve potential conflicts
derived from the tension between the individual’s desire to ad-
here to egalitarian values and standards and, at the same time,
to act in a manner that is consistent with their devaluation of
socially disadvantaged groups and commitment to the existing
social order (e.g., Jost, Wakslak, & Tyler, 2008; Pereira et al.,
2010). Moreover, the effects of legitimation in reinforcing
social inequality are often subtle, especially insofar as they are
accompanied by public compliance with social norms and
buttressed by hierarchy-enhancing myths and system-justifying
ideologies—some of which seem to be endorsed by members
of disadvantaged as well as advantaged groups. Although pro-
cesses of legitimation may operate subtly, their consequences
are profound; such processes may obscure the true nature of
existing inequalities and propel them into the future through a
matrix of excuses and justifications. Whether processes of
legitimation operate consciously or unconsciously or exert their
influence on members of dominant or non-dominant groups
(or both), they systematically perpetuate and often increase the
degree of inequality in the society.
Although the articles collected in this special issue signifi-
cantly advance the study of the legitimation of social inequal-
ity in many ways, important conceptual and empirical
questions remain. For instance, these articles make a clear
and convergent case that legitimation operates systematically
at the individual, group, and system levels to support social
inequality; the work also identifies individual differences and
social and contextual factors that moderate legitimation.
However, future work might consider more fully the role of
intrapersonal processes—psychological mechanisms within
individuals—that determine the ways in which individuals
legitimate social inequality. It is important to bear in mind that
such processes are not necessarily consciously undertaken or
strategic in a deliberate sense. According to the aversive
racism framework, the negative feelings that motivate discrim-
ination are often automatic and unconscious (Dovidio &
Gaertner, 2004). Similarly, many of the processes in system
justification involve the automatic internalization of attitudes
that support the status quo rather than an effortful search for
theories and explanations that can be used explicitly to justify
the promotion of inequality. Indeed, paternalism (Jackman,
1994), benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 2001), and
dependency-oriented helping (Nadler & Halabi, 2006) are all
ostensibly prosocial activities that reinforce the superior status
of one’s own group over another, and each can be pursued
either consciously or unconsciously (Bargh & Huang, 2009;
Gollwitzer & Bargh, 2005). At the same time, there are certainly
circumstances in which legitimation may be carried out through
deliberative and manipulative means (as in the case of propagan-
distic activity). Future research might therefore investigate the
circumstances in which legitimation may be undertakenCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.consciously or unconsciously and the consequences of different
legitimation processes for perpetuators of bias as well as their
targets.
In addition, we believe that research on the legitimation of
social inequality represents an important model for expanding
the theoretical and empirical perspectives of social psychology
more generally. Much of social psychology today focuses on
intraindividual processes and individual-level behavior. Work
on legitimation, by contrast, incorporates group-level and
system-level processes as well. Understanding legitimation
as a social and cultural phenomenon thus provides an impor-
tant bridge to allied disciplines, such as sociology and political
science, while maintaining psychology’s traditional focus on
individual-level processes. Research on the legitimation of
inequality may therefore stimulate renewed attention to
multiple levels of analysis—individual, group, and societal
levels (Doise, 1986; Stangor & Jost, 1997)—and, even more
importantly, to the dynamic interrelationships among
processes operating at these different levels.
In conclusion, with the publication of this special issue, we
have sought to increase our understanding of the relationship
between legitimation and inequality by highlighting general
theoretical themes and showcasing new empirical studies that
advance research on this topic in novel and important ways.
Collectively, the articles demonstrate the vitality of current
work on this topic. They also demonstrate the promise of
future research not only for developing a deeper and more
integrative theoretical understanding of the issue but also for
devising interventions that have the potential to replace broad
ideological assumptions about fairness with specific values,
belief systems, and personal commitments that facilitate the
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